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Abstract 
 
This contribution analyses under what conditions expert input is most likely to 
be regarded by government representatives as useful and how government representa-
tives use the input provided by experts. It widens the analytical lens examining multi-
lateral negotiations within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) between 2009 and 2011. The findings confirm the importance of 
deep knowledge, long-term involvement in the policy subsystem and networks. The 
study illustrates the importance of policy-entrepreneurial strategies such as pro-
actively approaching government representatives and volunteering knowledge. Join-
ing government delegations can increase expert input as they may gain access to the 
negotiation text. It is crucial to provide input early on in the negotiation cycle before 
the national negotiation position is decided. Although the UNFCCC can be classified 
as adversarial policy subsystem, scientific consensus on climate change facilitated by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) resulted in a convergence of 
the coalition’s policy beliefs towards understanding climate mitigation and adaptation 
as normative imperative. Actors however interpret expert input based on the con-
sensual IPCC findings depending on their conflicting political, i.e. secondary belief-
based normative objectives. Thus, instrumental and political use of expert input by the 
interest groups overlaps in the UNFCCC.  
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Abbreviations 
 
AOSIS  Alliance of Small Island States 
COP   Conference of the Parties 
EU  European Union 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change 
LDC  Least Developed Country 
MP  Member of Parliament 
NGO  Nongovernmental Organization 
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 
Experts are important actors in shaping political decisions in many areas of 
‘low politics’ such as environment, climate change, sustainable development, human 
rights, economic development or trade across multiple levels of governance (Bier-
mann 2001, 2002; Gulbrandsen 2008; Jasanoff 1990; Lahat 2011). These global chal-
lenges are highly complex without an ‘easy fix’ that could be delivered by one coun-
try alone. Consequently, they require international cooperation, evidence-based deci-
sion making and especially in-depth specialised knowledge to determine countries’ 
national interests and enable them to negotiate successfully with other actors, making 
expert input very relevant. Pointing towards the problem of climate change and pro-
viding scientific evidence is absolutely crucial, but it is not sufficient to influence pol-
icy making towards implementing a solution. Natural and social scientists frequently 
wonder how they can best present their research findings to maximize the impact of 
their policy implications. It is however very difficult to navigate the complex decision 
making structures dominated by vested interests, political negotiations, bargaining 
among stakeholder groups (Betsill and Corell 2008) and a social construction of sci-
ence (Haas 2004; Jasanoff 1990).  
This contribution analyses how government representatives use the input pro-
vided by experts and examines under what conditions expert input has the highest 
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chances of influencing policy-making on the international level. It contributes to 
theory by providing a close analysis of how input from experts as independent vari-
able prompts government delegates to reflect on the expert input as dependent vari-
able. A better understanding of when and why government representatives reflect on 
expert input can contribute to identify overall factors and conditions relevant for in-
fluencing the process (and thus potentially) outcomes of negotiations on large-scale, 
complex challenges of the 21st century such as climate change. 
Experts are individuals feeding knowledge into the policy-making process 
based on their own research such as scientists, policy analysts and researchers in gov-
ernmental and non-governmental institutions (Weible, 2008: 616). Expert-based in-
formation is different from local knowledge, which is based on trial-and-error learn-
ing (Adams 2004; van Kerkoff and Lebel 2006; Weible 2008: 616) and can be de-
fined as “content generated by professional, scientific and technical methods of in-
quiry (…) [, which is often] based on accepted analytical approaches as defined by 
professional peers” (Weible 2008: 616).  
This article contributes to our understanding of expert input on the interna-
tional level. It specifically responds to the call put forward by Weible et al. (2012) for 
empirical testing and refining their strategies of when individuals are more likely to 
influence the policy making process by presenting a case study on the use of expert 
input in international climate negotiations. This contribution analyses how gov-
ernment delegates regard the input by experts in the UNFCCC negotiations towards a 
treaty capable of preventing the worst consequences of climate change, the ‘post-
Kyoto agreement’. This is a critical case of policy-making on the international level 
that unites characteristics of global governance such as common-pool resources, 
common action problems (Ostrom 1990) and the institutional constraints inherent in 
multilateral negotiations and decision-making (Biermann 2012). It thus widens the 
analytical lens to also include the international level, which has taken a side-role in 
other empirical and theoretical studies with few notable exceptions (Auer 1998; Bet-
sill and Corell 2008; Stone 2000).  
The case study focuses on direct expert input into the UNFCCC negotiations, 
which has so far been widely neglected in the empirical literature.  It does not provide 
another empirical study to the literature on the IPCC, which indirectly influences the 
UNFCCC negotiations as expert body (e.g. see Boehmer-Christiansen 1994a, 1994b; 
Skodvin 2000; Underdal 2000), or the climate regime in general (e.g. Andresen 2013; 
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Betsill and Corell 2008; Biermann et al. 2010; Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004; Mit-
chell et al. 2006). Instead, it rather fills a distinctive gap in the wider literature on how 
government representatives perceive and use expert input as dependent variable. The 
case study is particularly relevant as climate change is regarded as ‘super-wicked’ 
(Levin et al. 2012: 124) and ‘malign’ (Miles et al. 2002) problem making expert in-
fluence less likely than in other issue areas such as the ozone regime. Climate change 
is defined as super-wicked problem given that “time is running out; those who cause 
the problem also seek to provide a solution; the central authority needed to address 
them is weak or non-existent; and irrational discounting occurs that pushes responses 
into the future” (Levin et al. 2012: 124). This makes climate change negotiations the 
least likely area for experts to provide input that is used by government representa-
tives - and thereby an interesting test case to determine potential routes of influence 
even under the most difficult circumstances. Wider implications would be careful in-
ferences that these routes of potential influence are more likely to be also valid for 
other cases that are less difficult than climate change negotiations.  
Theory-based (Weible 2008; Weible et al. 2012) and empirical work improved 
our understanding of the role of expert knowledge and the use of evidence in policy-
making on the national level in developing countries such as India (Biermann 2001; 
2002) and developed countries such as Norway, Sweden (Gulbrandsen 2008), the 
United Kingdom (Owens 2010) and the United States (Jasanoff 1990) in subsystems 
such as marine protection areas (Weible and Sabatier 2005); biotechnology (Mont-
petit 2011) and water governance (Beveridge 2012). A gap remains in the literature 
on empirical studies examining how government representatives involved in interna-
tional negotiations use expert input. Weible et al. (2012: 6) point out that individuals 
matter in the policy making process and that actors seeking to shape policy interact in 
issue-specific policy subsystems spanning the national, sub-national and local level. 
This contribution thus widens the concept of policy subsystems to include the interna-
tional level that influences domestic policy making (Bernstein and Cashore 2012). 
The climate change regime is such an example of a diverse and increasingly frag-
mented policy subsystem (Biermann 2012).  
The key research question is what individual factors and conditions enable an 
expert to make a contribution to international negotiations that is regarded as relevant 
and useful by government representatives and how these use scientific input. The re-
search finds that individual factors matter regarding how well experts communicate 
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their findings to government representatives and as how useful the expert input is re-
garded. Individual expert input matters if government representatives perceive them 
as trustworthy and ‘neutral’ actors, if experts make use of their personal networks to 
government representatives early in the negotiation process and act as policy entre-
preneurs by actively promoting their research findings.  
The next section of this article examines the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture on expert participation and the different uses of expert knowledge in policy mak-
ing across different levels of policy-making. The third section provides an overview 
of the climate change negotiations as suitable case study. The fourth section outlines 
the methodology used. The fifth section presents and discusses the empirical findings 
of the case study, both on when government delegates regard the input of experts as 
most useful, and how the input is used in the negotiations. The conclusion reviews the 
findings and discusses implications for further research. 
 
 
Expert input in policy-making  
 
 
Strategies that help experts increase their likelihood of influencing policy 
 
Academic research expert input to policy making dates back several decades (Haas 
1990; Jasanoff 1990; Kingdon 1984; Underdal 2000). This review focuses on the 
framework presented by Weible (2008; Weible et al. 2012) as the most suitable basis 
for the empirical analysis of the research question and further theory development. 
The literature on experts providing input to policy-making distinguishes three key 
strategies making influence more likely (Weible et al. 2012). First, experts need deep 
knowledge of their policy subfield, which means they need to be aware of their own 
underlying beliefs, have detailed analytic knowledge of their field, and be aware of 
local and temporal framework conditions and potential influences from interdepend-
ent policy subsystems (Weible et al. 2012: 9-13). This deep knowledge needs to co-
incide with long-term participation of the expert in the policy subsystem. This allows 
experts to establish a trustful relationship with other actors in the policy subsystem 
(Weible et al. 2012). Building such networks to government representatives is the 
third crucial strategy making influence more likely. When experts have established a 
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relationship based on trust and reputation, their input is more likely to be taken into 
consideration in policy making (Weible et al. 2012). 
Experts furthermore can improve their chances of providing input to policy-
making by acting as agents of change, facilitating learning and the political or instru-
mental use of knowledge (Weible 2008) depending on their own objectives. Such pol-
icy entrepreneurs are individuals proactively working “from outside the formal gov-
ernmental system to introduce, translate, and implement innovative ideas into public 
sector practice” (Roberts and King 1991: 152). They are characterised as “political 
fixers” with a deep understanding of political dynamics, awareness of the key players 
and a clear intent to influence the policy-process (Young and Mendizabal 2009: 2). 
Thus ‘expert’ policy entrepreneurs act as knowledge brokers and ‘teachers’, actively 
promoting the advantages of their favourite policy-proposal (Bomberg 2007; Stone 
2000). Experts can be found in most negotiation groups: as state representatives, as 
members of research and independent NGOs or with interest groups such as envi-
ronmental NGOs (Stone 2000; Young and Mendiazabal 2009). In a domestic context, 
they contribute to policy making in individual capacity or as members of scientific 
advisory bodies.  
 
 
Political and instrumental use of expert-based information 
 
Decisions in policy making are not necessarily based on scientific knowledge 
alone. Government representatives also need to consider normative aspects (Weible et 
al. 2012: 11) and political preferences, local knowledge, traditions and values. As all 
knowledge, scientific knowledge is socially constructed and needs to be interpreted in 
its social and political context (Jasanoff 1990). Therefore, taking into consideration 
normative assessments helps mitigate the inherent bias in academic disciplines (Co-
hen 2006) that may only focus on aspects of a policy problem or are constrained by 
methodological limitations (Weible et al. 2011).  
In his review on expert-based information and policy subsystems Weible 
(2008) distinguishes three categories for assessing the input of expert-based know-
ledge: learning, political use and instrumental use. Learning can happen in different 
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ways, but usually requires a longer time period and overwhelming scientific evidence 
(Weible 2008). As this contribution focuses on the question of how government dele-
gates regard and use the input of experts (what can potentially result in learning later 
on), the preliminary steps of political and instrumental use are more relevant. Deci-
sion-makers may use scientific input strategically and selectively to justify or legiti-
mise their policy preferences (Weible 2008).  
Instrumental use of scientific expertise refers to direct influence of expert 
knowledge on the policy-making process. It is more likely to occur in professional 
forums where interest coalitions cooperate with scientists (Weible 2008: 620). Mont-
petit (2011) empirically examined the relationship between science and politics as 
well as the role of science within politics and finds a predominantly political use of 
scientific knowledge. The ‘sedimentation’ approach emphasises the importance of 
mounting scientific evidence provided by different individuals (Weiss 1977, 1979) re-
sulting in scientific consensus in support of a policy change. This points towards the 
relevance of epistemic communities (Haas, 1990, 1992). Epistemic communities con-
sist of experts sharing normative, principled and causal beliefs based on consensual 
knowledge with common notions of validity or a common policy project drawing on 
shared values, interests and a commitment to produce and apply knowledge (Haas 
1992: 2). They provide input to international negotiations on the domestic and inter-
national level via actively participating in the policy process. This review leads to the 
hypothesis that government representatives should regard as most relevant the input 
provided by experts who possess deep knowledge and have been involved in the pol-
icy subsystem over a long time to build networks. It also leads us to expect that the 
knowledge be used politically based on whether it coincides with or further underpins 
political objectives. The following section provides an overview of the climate change 
negotiations within the UNFCCC. 
 
The climate change negotiations  
 
Climate change emerged as important challenge of the 21st century on the glo-
bal agenda next to poverty alleviation (Stern 2006). The international climate negotia-
tions are a suitable case study choice as they display most central characteristics for 
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expert involvement identified as relevant by the academic literature: scientific evi-
dence plays an important role as basis for decision-making (Skodvin 2000), it in-
volves scientific uncertainty (IPCC 2007; Thompson 2010) and collective action 
problems as for most public goods with short-term national costs and long-term glo-
bal benefits (Ostrom 1990; Stern 2006). The negotiations are complex and require 
specialised knowledge given the diverse technical issues involved such as carbon ac-
counting for land use changes, monitoring and verifying of emissions, marked-based 
instruments, climate finance and technology transfer (Depledge 2005; ENB 2009a; 
2009b; 2010; 2011; 2012). 
Policy subsystems can either be unitary, collaborative or adversarial (Weible 
2008: 622). The UNFCCC can be classified as an adversarial policy-subsystem as it 
consists of competitive coalitions of countries with similar policy and secondary be-
liefs that coordinate closely in negotiation blocs. There is a low compatibility of be-
liefs among coalitions. While most developing countries share the belief that it is the 
historical responsibility of industrialized countries to mitigate climate change, in-
dustrialized countries hold the secondary belief that the major emitters of the 21st 
century, which are the developing countries, also need to take on legally binding 
emission reductions (ENB 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011). Thus, the policy images are 
debated and a win-lose perspective on policy designs is dominant (Weible 2008: 622). 
The premises that authority is centralized but fragmented within the policy system 
and that venues are flexible (Weible 2008: 622-625) are less applicable. Other than in 
the national context, there is no government-type central authority among sovereign 
country representatives in multilateral intergovernmental negotiations, which are 
characterised by flat hierarchies and the interaction of multiple interests and stake-
holders (Betsill and Corell 2008). Due to the need to find consensus in the UNFCCC 
negotiations, there is no dominant coalition as each country and coalition has veto 
power. 
Despite the efforts of climate diplomats to achieve a comprehensive post-
Kyoto agreement limiting the emissions of greenhouse gases to sustainable levels 
(IPCC 2007; Stern 2006) a small group of states drafted the Copenhagen Accords at 
COP-15 in December 2009. Experts and other nongovernmental actors provided con-
tinued input at COP-16 in Cancun/Mexico and COP-17 in Durban/South Africa (UN-
FCCC 2010c; UNFCCC 2011a; 2011b). The negotiation process of the UNFCCC 
centres on the COP as major annual meeting and several preparatory meetings. In 
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these meetings, diplomats and national experts meet on the technocratic level discuss-
ing negotiation topics in their specific sub-fields of expertise within their given nego-
tiation mandate. These are concerned with further commitments under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, technology trans-
fer. Between 2009 and 2011, the UNFCCC negotiation process was organised into 
four major negotiation streams. Each group, which is further split into contact groups, 
works on negotiation text relating to the tasked specific ‘technical’ issues such as cli-
mate finance, technology transfer or forestry. This negotiation text is forwarded to the 
political level, the meeting of the ministers or heads of states at the COP. The climate 
change negotiations within the UNFCCC can thus be understood as a policy subsys-
tem with even more issue-specific sub-subsystems. 
There are different negotiation blocs within the UNFCCC negotiations. In or-
der to achieve an outcome, all states need to agree in the consensus-based decision 
making structure. The UNFCCC can be regarded as typical UN negotiation setting. 
The failure to agree official rules of procedure has left the UNFCCC with working 
rules of procedure that effectively grant every country a veto, therefore the need to 
gain consensus is especially central (Kjellen 2007).  Experts have the option of either 
aligning themselves with a negotiation bloc or remaining ‘neutral’ to be able to pro-
vide input to different negotiation blocs. The interest groups are split up along the ne-
gotiation blocs of countries grouped together based on their shared negotiation objec-
tives. During the negotiations, these negotiation blocs frequently speak with one voice 
and articulate their negotiation bloc’s common position (ENB 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 
2011). The six major negotiation blocs are the European Union with 27 members, the 
Umbrella Group with 8 members, the Environmental Integrity Group with 3 members 
and the G77+China group with 155 members. The next sections present and discuss 
the empirical findings.  
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
 
 
The analysis on how governmental representatives perceive the input of ex-
perts is based on empirical data collected by the author at the UNFCCC negotiations 
in Barcelona (November 2009), Copenhagen (December 2009) and Bonn (April 2010, 
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June 2011, June 2012, May 2013) and interviews with European policy makers (April 
2012 to September 2013) and at the Rio+20 UNCED summit on sustainable devel-
opment in Rio de Janeiro (June 2012). The author interviewed (partly multiple) repre-
sentatives of 26 different countries. Thus, the sample accounts for 13 percent of the 
overall population of 196 countries represented in the UNFCCC.  
To account for the diverse perspectives of government representatives from 
each major negotiation block, semi-structured interviews of approximately 30 minutes 
were conducted with randomly chosen representatives of each negotiation bloc selec-
ted based on their active participation in the negotiations. The interview sample ac-
counts for at least 6 per cent of the country population within each sub-sample. The 
interview sample includes both accounts from civil servants (37 interviews), who 
conduct the majority of the negotiations and are the primary access point for experts 
seeking to provide input, and politicians (11 interviews) who ultimately make the de-
cisions prepared by civil servants and lend democratic legitimisation to the input pro-
vided by various stakeholders. Table 1 provides an overview of the negotiation blocs, 
member states (population) and the number of interviews conducted.  
 
Negotiation bloc (number of members) 
Number of countries interviewed 
(per cent of sample population) 
European Union (27) 9 (33%) 
Umbrella Group (9) 3 (37%) 
Environmental Integrity Group (3)  1 (30%) 
G77+China (65)  
(excluding LDC and AOSIS countries) 
6 (9%) 
 
Alliance of Small Island States (40) 4 (10%) 
Least Developed Countries (50) 3 (6%) 
Total number of countries represented in sample 
(total population: 194) 
26  
(13% of country sample population) 
 
Table 1. Overview of interview sample according to countries. The overall sample of 48 in-
terviews includes interviews with more than one representative, especially from the EU. 
 
 
The researcher explored the ego perceptions of experts by conducting 46 
structured and semi-structured interviews with experts on their activities, the input 
they provide to the national and international level and the strategies they use. 33 ex-
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perts self-identified as academics working in higher education or for a research insti-
tute and 13 experts emphasized their double affiliation as academics and representa-
tives of special interest non-governmental organisations. They were selected based on 
their visible participation in the UNFCCC negotiations. This interview-based ap-
proach was supplemented with participant observation by the researcher. 
The responses of government representatives and experts were analysed using 
a sequential triangulation strategy (Creswell 2009) of ego and alter perceptions (Gul-
brandsen and Andresen 2004). Thus, the interviews focused on how government 
delegates regarded the input of experts, i.e. the alter perceptions, and compared these 
with the experts’ ego-perceptions of their influence. There is a bias in the interview 
sample towards industrialised countries and towards the EU. The interview material 
was analysed using the qualitative software NVivo to determine patterns and relevant 
concepts (King et al. 1994) and is presented with detailed quotes and in aggregate 
form similar to Lawhon’s (2012) approach. The following section presents and dis-
cusses the findings. It analyses how government representatives perceive the input by 
experts and under what conditions they are more inclined to act upon it. 
 
 
 
Strategies for experts to effectively provide input into negotiations  
 
Government representatives regard individuals with detailed knowledge of the 
issue area in which they are providing advice as experts. These hold higher research-
based degrees in their area and either work for universities, independent research in-
stitutes providing policy-relevant advice or for government departments. Experts are 
individuals who share the objective to be neutral observers of the negotiation process, 
driven by individual initiative and pro-active involvement (RINGO 39 12/2009; par-
ticipant observation Copenhagen 12/2009 and Bonn 6/2011). In the UNFCCC nego-
tiations, the majority of experts participate as delegates within the Research and Inde-
pendent NGO constituency sharing the norms of objective, peer-reviewed research 
and commitment to scientific inquiry. Experts at UNFCCC are individual actors pur-
suing their own scientific interests. 
	   12	  
 
 
 
Personal capabilities, policy entrepreneurial strategies and networks  
 
How effectively experts communicate their research findings to government 
representatives depends on their personal capabilities and the strategies they pursue. 
The majority of experts attending UNFCCC negotiations only observe, network or 
conduct research (UNFCCC 2010a, 2010b). This section focuses on non-
governmental experts seeking to influence the negotiations. Objectives and motiva-
tions are most commonly facilitating an outcome that contributes to limiting the nega-
tive consequences of climate change to levels recommended by the IPCC. Further-
more, experts try to change government’s positions on issues or contribute to the ne-
gotiation text (interviews with experts 2, 5, 7, 17, 20, 24, 28, 30, 35; 6/2010).  
Input to the negotiations can be most obviously provided through side events, 
publications and engaging in capacity-building activities with governments, especially 
from developing countries. Many experts and their institutions distribute hard copies 
of their publications at exhibition booths such as the World Resource Institute and the 
University of California or are engaged in side events such as the Overseas Develop-
ment Institute on the effectiveness of climate financing; the University of Leeds on 
the economics of low carbon cities; and the University of Oxford on climate vulnera-
bilities in island states (UNFCCC 2011c). Government delegations especially value 
expert input as means of capacity building,2 both before and during the negotiations. 
While also developed countries use experts as advisors, especially developing count-
ries with limited resources rely on research input and capacity building to form their 
national position and to prepare for the negotiations:  
 
They provide input in terms of research, reports, and experts. We are working to-
gether with many experts from research institutions, universities [and] think tanks 
(…). They help us with background information and technical knowledge. The 
negotiations are so complex, so we need somebody who knows what is required 
by science as a goal that is independent from the rich countries interests - and it is 
hard to have an eye on everything. 
(LDC 1 4/2011) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 These experts are for example professors in country delegations from Boston University (Pakistan), 
Columbia University (Papua New Guinea), Greifswald University (Belarus), University of Lis-
bon/University of Southampton (European Community), Lund University (Netherlands), or from uni-
versities in the countries they represent, UNFCCC 2010a, 2010b. 
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The expert’s expectations match the government representatives’ emphasis on 
expertise, experience, networks and pro-active engagement. 88-95 per cent of the 40 
experts furthermore agreed in the structured interviews on the relevance of expertise, 
the outgoing personality of the expert as basis for acting as policy entrepreneur and 
the reputation as expert. Particularly the reputation is linked to the network and can be 
regarded as proxy for long-term engagement and in-depth knowledge of the policy 
sub-field. Joining government delegations offers access to the informal negotiations, 
the outcome text and senior decision-makers: 
 
Professors and researchers provide up to date expert knowledge. And by provid-
ing this scientific basis, we have a large influence and can shape the national po-
sition if we are proactive and contribute early in the process. Later on, when I 
used my excellent network to people working for government and managed to get 
into the delegation, I can take influence by negotiating on behalf of [my country]. 
For example, I have direct access to the negotiation text. When I make a proposal 
in my contact group, the chair asks me how I would like to phase the proposal, 
which should be agreed with other members of the Umbrella Group.  
(Expert who joined a G-8 government delegation; Umbrella Group 2 12/2009) 
 
To influence government delegations, experts must proactively engage with 
the government delegates in their network (EU 1 4/2010; EU 2 11/2011; Germany 
12/2009; Japan 12/2009; Latin America 4/2010; Umbrella Group 4/2011): 
 
For technical details, we have expert advisors in EU delegations, especially 
where the ministries do not have the specialised expertise. We do not beg 
them to help us. We have a good relationship that is built on trust and personal 
relations with a number of experts, who frequently offer their opinions on 
proposals, provide us with data and policy recommendations. Usually they ap-
proach us with the information they have to offer, and we look at the informa-
tion and use it to decide on our position.  
(Ireland 12/2009) 
 
This is also confirmed by an expert who joined a G8 government delegation: 
 
I myself work for a Research NGO and I managed to get the government to in-
vite me to represent them here at the negotiations (…). Thereby I can make a 
big contribution to influence the negotiation process. I have been out there, done 
research in the field and know the data very well. I know what I am talking 
about and I can directly introduce the research results into the negotiation pro-
cess and thereby convince other governments I am negotiating with to do more.  
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(Expert who joined a G-8 government delegation; Umbrella Group 2 12/2009)  
 
 
While joining government delegations is the most effective way of influencing 
negotiations as individual expert, their neutrality is being contested when having to 
represent a national position that contradicts research findings. An alternative ap-
proach is contributing without joining government delegations. The Meridian Institute 
is a research institute providing negotiation training to government delegates while its 
experts remain independent. This model allows acting as policy entrepreneur and 
introducing negotiation text such as at COP-17, when delegates from the Meridian 
Institute were involved in drafting a “Joint Declaration of Intent on REDD+ in the 
Congo Basin between Central African and donor countries.” It was ultimately sup-
ported by the EU and other countries (EU 7 12/2011). 
 
 
 
Why timing matters  
 
 
 
Experts can influence different stages of the negotiation cycle, which can be 
understood as five central segments similar to the policy cycle (Everett 2003). The 
first segment is recognition of the problem and agenda setting on the national level. 
After consultation and capacity building, the national position is formed. Once 
decided, it is very difficult to change (AOSIS 4/2010; EU 1 4/2010; Germany 
12/2009; Ireland 12/2009; Latin America 4/2010): 
  
Experts have a large influence providing research input early on, when we decide 
on our national and regional bloc position. The closer we come to the negotia-
tions, especially large ones, the less influence they can have since the countries 
positions are fixed and cannot simply be changed during the negotiations since 
the regional bloc position has also already been agreed upon in the European 
Council.  
(EU 1 4/2010) 
 
Governments carry their national position into the regional organisation 
meetings (e.g. EU, AOSIS, G77+China), where a negotiation bloc position is formed 
and modified (LDC 2 4/2010; Umbrella Group 4/2010; Vanuatu 12/2009). 
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Consequently, the influence of experts diminishes with each step in the negotiation 
cycle with the largest potential influence early on in the negotiations: 
 
We especially need their input early in the process, directly after the last COP 
when we sort out the negotiation results and try to decide on our position for 
the next year. This position is then discussed with other governments in the 
European Council and then we agree on an EU position.  
 
(Ireland 12/2009) 
 
Scientific studies particularly from public universities in the respective 
countries are influential as well as experts actively seeking to provide input:  
 
As soon as we have need for data and information that is not within the capacity 
of our ministries, we outsource this service. We pay universities, think tanks and 
independent experts to provide research input, as we need it. (…) We also include 
academic experts in our delegation. (…) But we do not ask them to join us; we 
nominate them if they request us to do so. But all in all, academics have a 
considerable influence on the national position, providing scientific input and 
expertise before and during the negotiations. 
(Latin America 4/2010) 
 
Thus government delegates regard expert input early on in the negotiation 
cycle as most useful as they can more readily incorporate it into their negotiation 
position. The next section evaluates to what extent the empirical findings confirm the 
hypotheses put forward by the theory-based literature.  
 
Discussion of the empirical findings on how negotiators perceive expert input 
 
Overall, the hypotheses proposed by Weible et al. (2012) regarding the im-
portance of deep expertise, long-term involvement and networks can be confirmed al-
so for expert input on the international level within multilateral negotiations. Deep 
expertise and in-depth knowledge regarding a specific policy area is crucial to provide 
input to the negotiations that the government delegates regard as useful. Negotiators 
in UNFCCC negotiations (with climate change policy as a policy subsystem) tend to 
be very specialised in their negotiation field, which could be considered as a sub-sub 
policy system such as emission trading or measuring, reporting and verification of 
greenhouse emissions. The sub-areas are so specialised that a carbon accounting spe-
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cialist does not necessarily know much about climate finance and vice versa, thus ex-
perts also need to be very specialised within the sub-sub system, while broad know-
ledge is less useful. Furthermore, developing countries and small states frequently 
lack this specialised knowledge and thus require capacity building in the form of spe-
cific expert input on these negotiation issues. 
Close networks to government representatives are essential; as they tend to in-
volve experts they already know and have worked with previously. These also wait 
for input from experts, making experts most successful who take the initiative and of-
fer their expertise proactively (EU 1 4/2010; EU 8 4/2012; Ireland 12/2009; LDC 1 
4/2010; Umbrella Group 4/2010). To be accepted into government negotiations, ex-
perts need to establish a high level of trust to safeguard confidential government in-
formation and to represent the government’s position even if it diverges from their be-
liefs or research findings (AOSIS 1 12/2009; EU 1 4/2010; Germany 12/2009; Iran 
12/2009; Japan 12/2009; UAE 12/2009; Umbrella Group 4/2010). This level of trust 
requires a close network and ‘strong ties’ (Granovetter 1973; Weible et al. 2012: 14). 
The hypothesis put forward by Weible et al.’s (2012: 13-14) that weak ties are more 
effective to influence policy making does not hold true for expert input in the 
UNFCCC as governments require strong ties, trust and ‘true’ useful expertise to ac-
cept experts into their delegations to let them negotiate on their behalf.  
Different types of networks can be distinguished. The findings indicate that 
epistemic communities of academics that belong to the same discipline (Haas 1992) 
are not particularly relevant. Experts act rather as individuals providing input and do 
not coordinate with the other members of their epistemic community (participant ob-
servation at mitigation roundtables, Bonn 6/2011; Yamin and Rahambros 2011). 
Networks that involve experts, government representatives and other (non-) gov-
ernmental actors sharing beliefs, values and policy objectives (Weible et al 2009) are 
crucial. These networks are close-knit with frequent interactions at various UNFCCC 
meetings on the technical level. Therefore, actors know each other well. This is also 
reinforced by negotiation dynamics within negotiation blocs such as, G77+China, the 
EU and the Umbrella Group where countries share similar policy and secondary be-
liefs, i.e. negotiation objectives on overall targets and instrument design. Long-term 
involvement is also an important condition for experts to provide useful input into the 
negotiations.  
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The findings confirm Weible et al.’s factors for influence (Weible et al. 2012) 
and allow expanding on their list of factors by adding that experts should take on the 
role of policy entrepreneurs and actively market their knowledge. Acting as policy-
entrepreneur and making use of windows of opportunity (Weible et al., 2012: 15) is 
crucial as the potential to provide input is not constant across the different stages of 
the negotiation cycle. Weible et al. (2012) suggest a long-term perspective of a decade 
for knowledge to diffuse into the subsystem and learning to occur among the indi-
viduals involved. This holds also true for UNFCCC negotiations, where especially the 
2007 IPCC report had a strong influence on government’s negotiation positions, but 
the two years before the crucial climate summit in Copenhagen in 2009 were insuffi-
cient for the positions of key actors to change or adapt accordingly. However, by 
2011 the scientific consensus of limiting mean temperature increases to 2°C is widely 
accepted within the UNFCCC (ENB 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011). So in conclusion, the 
three key strategies for experts to influence policy making can also be confirmed for 
international multilateral negotiations at the example of the UNFCCC climate change 
negotiations between 2009 and 2011. The following section examines how this input 
provided by experts is used instrumentally or politically by government representa-
tives (Haas 2004; Jasanoff 1990; Weible 2008). 
 
 
Use of expert knowledge by government representatives 
 
Within the UNFCCC negotiations government and experts alike emphasise 
boundaries. Both distinguish between the technocratic expert level, where civil ser-
vants from the relevant government departments represent the country in specialised 
working groups (EU 5 12/2011; EU 6 12/2011) and the negotiations on the political 
high-level where ministers or heads of states represent their country on overall politi-
cal objectives. The findings illustrate a differing use of knowledge based on which 
level a government representative operates. Civil servants on the technocratic level 
emphasize the instrumental use of knowledge, as they are predominantly concerned 
with providing policy options based on available scientific evidence. Politicians as 
higher level government representatives and decision makers however need to take po-
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litical aspects into account and thus use scientific input differently. Politicians made 
no distinction between knowledge provided by experts versus input from interest 
groups (High level representative EU 4/2012; Minister from AOSIS country 4/2010; 
MP 1 4/2012; MP 2 6/2012; MP 3 7/2012; MP 4 7/2012; MP 5 9/2012; MP 6 9/2012; 
MP 7 9/2012; politician from Sweden 2012; senior level advisor UK 3/2012). They 
emphasized a political use based on what information helps them to underpin their po-
litical objectives. 
 
Instrumental use of expertise by civil servants 
 
While some nongovernmental constituencies within the UNFCCC such as En-
vironmental NGOs or Business and Industry NGOs engage in advocacy for their ob-
jectives either as organisation or in close collaboration within their negotiation blocs, 
experts as members of Research and Independent NGOs occupy a distinct position 
given that most government delegates characterise their representatives as impartial, 
neutral normative authorities as opposed to interest groups classified as lobbyists:3 
 
 
Other delegates directly working for government have a high appreciation for our 
expertise and neutrality. This is why they frequently ask us for more input and 
background information. They are also happy when we take the initiative and pro-
pose possible compromises that are in line with what science demands. They see us 
as a kind of neutral authority.  
 
(Expert who joined a G-8 government delegation; Umbrella Group 2 12/2009) 
 
The information they provide is regarded as unbiased towards serving certain 
interests (Interview with delegate from AOSIS 2 4/2010; EU 1 4/2010; EU 2 11/2011; 
Germany 12/2009; Ireland 12/2009; Japan 12/2009; LDC 1 4/2010; Latin America 
4/2010; Umbrella Group 1 4/2010; UAE 12/2009). Thus, government delegates at-
tribute the highest credibility to input by experts representing a university or research 
institute as compared to experts representing interest groups such as NGOs:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The majority of the civil servants interviewed mention or confirm this view, 2009-2012.	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We regularly consult with researchers from think tanks and universities, at rare oc-
casions also from environmental NGOs. The problem with environmental NGOs is 
that they are often biased, and therefore the information they are providing is not as 
useful as the information provided by experts representing research and independ-
ent NGOs, who are neutral. 
(EU 1 4/2010) 
 
This empirical research finding of government delegates’ positivist view regard-
ing experts does not match the academic literature on the political use of knowledge 
but rather points towards an instrumental use (Weible et al. 2012). From a constructiv-
ist point of view knowledge is frequently contested and its presentation is influenced 
by underlying values and shared beliefs among members of an epistemic community 
(Haas 2004). Knowledge is not necessarily objective or neutral (Jasanoff 1990; Young 
and Mendizabal 2009), especially in its policy implications (Sharman and Holmes 
2010). Some epistemic communities frame nuclear power, carbon capture and storage, 
geo-engineering and biofuels as solutions. How well risks, uncertainties and costs to 
other generations, populations or ecosystems are communicated can have a major im-
pact on how politically acceptable these approaches are perceived. Furthermore, ex-
perts need to be aware that their research findings may be framed as politically favour-
able by environmental activist groups, industry or governments as they may scientifi-
cally underpin and legitimize their political objectives (Haas 2004; Gulbrandsen 
2008). This can lead to an uneasy relationship (Underdal 2000) and political research 
utilization (Weiss 1979). Consequently knowledge is not necessarily objective, neutral 
and instrumentally used, but can also be contested and used strategically to advocate 
certain political solutions favoured by an epistemic community (Haas 2004; Jasanoff 
1990) or political actor (Weible et al. 2012). 
Combined with the finding that experts at UNFCCC do not form an epistemic 
community, but are rather individual representatives of different epistemic communi-
ties, questions of accountability and transparency need to be addressed (Mason 2005; 
Jasanoff 2012) as the line towards lobbying and advocacy (Gulbrandsen and Andresen 
2004) may be blurred. This may happen intentionally in the case of experts working 
for government, industry or special interest NGOs as the experts have to represent the 
official position of their employer, or unintentionally in the case of experts participat-
ing via research and independent NGOs in their personal capacity. The self-
understanding of the interviewed experts was closer to the constructivist, political-
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institutional perspective of science that is framed in a certain way and rarely exists in a 
‘neutral’ vacuum (Jasanoff 1990). In the structured and semi-structured interviews 28 
percent of experts identified themselves as both academics affiliated with a university 
and as engaged with environmental NGOs or other interest groups. However, most ex-
perts also regarded themselves as personally convinced holding underlying beliefs that 
coincide with the expertise they contribute to the negotiations: 
You can also convince them to do more and raise their targets with convincing and 
methodologically sound researched information.  
 
(Expert 41 12/2009) 
 
Civil servants hold the positivist view of science as neutral, dispassionate and 
trustworthy information, what matches with popular perceptions of science (Ozawa 
1991; Weible 2008: 616). The civil servant’s point of view could further be under-
stood as engaging in ‘boundary work’. Scientists involved in the policy-making pro-
cess are known to resort to boundary work, which refers to ascribing their work in a 
binary science-policy continuum to the science-end as purely scientific to shield it 
from political interests and being used as justification for pre-existing political objec-
tives at the policy-making end of the continuum (Haas 2004: 571; Jasanoff 1990). By 
emphasizing the importance of ‘neutral’ experts as advisors and taking a positivist 
point of view, civil servants are engaging in such ‘boundary work’ (Jasanoff 1990). 
One end of the continuum are independent experts without their own negotiation ob-
jectives providing reliable, ‘true’ scientific input as credible, unbiased authority. At the 
other end of the continuum are ‘lobbyists’, representatives of interest groups who may 
have expertise on the issue or not. Civil servants regard their input as biased in support 
of their specific negotiation objective and usually treated with special caution. The in-
terviewed civil servants decisively framed the key factor for defining someone as an 
expert with accordingly high impact on their position as an individual, usually an aca-
demic working for an university or research institute, who has ‘scientific knowledge to 
contribute’ in terms of capacity building: 
Scientists have a different status than Environmental NGOs - they have something 
to contribute and many delegations rely on their help to prepare for the negotia-
tions, master the technical details that are so important and to get training for their 
less experienced delegates.  
(UAE 12/2009) 
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In conclusion, civil servants regard the input from experts as ‘neutral’ and thus 
instrumentally use knowledge (Weible et al. 2012). Thereby they set up a binary 
boundary between the ‘neutral’ and trustworthy experts and the ‘biased’ lobbyists 
from special interest groups.  
Political use of expertise by politicians  
 
The research findings point towards an instrumental use of the input provided 
by experts by civil servants working on the technocratic level. As soon as discussion 
points touch the ‘political sphere’, i.e. where there are no scientific or technical argu-
ments in support or against the proposition, civil servant negotiators tend to leave the 
issue to the political level (participant observation by the author in Copenhagen, 
12/2009; Bonn, 4/2010; 6/2011; also UNCSD in Rio de Janeiro, 6/2012). The political 
level describes issues requiring value judgements linked to voter preferences, national 
and economic interests, overall topics dealt with by politicians. This distinction is im-
portant as the technocratic and the political level deal differently with scientific input. 
Based on the literature developed in a national context on research utilization 
(Jasanoff 1990; Montpetit 2011; Weible 2008; Weible et al 2012: 11; Weiss, 1979: 
429), we would expect a political use of expert input in the climate change negotia-
tions, at least by politicians on the political level. Interview data collected as control 
measure in a national policy making context suggests that politicians do use and admit 
to using expert input to further their political objectives. Key contributions to the aca-
demic literature predict that the political use of knowledge and scientific input as a 
‘weapon’ against opposing interest groups (Weiss 1979) is highest in adversarial pol-
icy sub-systems (Weible 2008: 628) such as the UNFCCC. Montpetit (2011) also ar-
rives at this finding in the context of analysing 17 biotechnology subsystems in a na-
tional context.  
The empirical analysis in this contribution however finds no evidence in sup-
port of this proposition in the international context of multilateral climate change ne-
gotiations. There are a number of factors that may explain this finding. First, although 
the UNFCCC can be classified as adversarial policy subsystem (Weible 2008) due to 
different negotiation blocs holding diverse shared beliefs and values, the IPCC has a 
reconciling role as it represents a scientific consensus that is accept by all actors in the 
policy subsystem. We would expect this scientific consensus rather in a unitary policy 
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subsystem (Weible 2008). The negotiation blocs hold different secondary beliefs re-
garding distributive issues about who should take action on climate change, when and 
to what extent. Both civil servants and politicians active in the climate negotiations 
however also share the policy belief based on the IPCC’s scientific consensus that 
climate change is a threat and that mean temperature increase must be reduced to a 
level that limits negative consequences to the earth system (ENB 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 
2011; participant observation by the author in Barcelona 2009; Copenhagen 2009; 
Bonn 2010, 2011). Thus, the scientific consensus has permeated into the negotiations 
as a political consensus. This is reflected in the Copenhagen Accords and the Cancun 
Agreements (UNFCCC 2010): for the first time all countries, including the developing 
countries, agreed that global mean temperature increases must be limited to 2°C. Un-
like in the domestic debate in the United States where climate sceptics doubt the exist-
ence of climate change and portray ‘global warming as democratic scam’ (GCS 2013), 
government representatives in the international negotiations share the policy belief that 
climate change is a real threat, refer to the IPCC for evidence and are less inclined to 
use scientific findings and expert input as a weapon.  
This shared belief based on the scientific consensus for climate change results 
in a different political use of expert input. Both politicians and to a limited extent civil 
servants use expert input to underpin their positions in the same way, but draw differ-
ent normative political interpretations from the same expert input. Developing count-
ries represented by the G77+China coalition historic responsibilities of developed 
countries to reduce emissions, “stressing that the current level of ambition from devel-
oped countries is ‘unacceptable,’ [the African Union] emphasised the need for ambi-
tious numbers in line with the science” (ENB 2009a: 4) and G77+China representa-
tives urge “Annex I parties to close the gap between the current emission reduction 
pledges and what is required by science” (ENB 2010: 12). In many of the contact 
groups negotiating the text countries discuss “ways to increase Annex I parties’ level 
of ambition in order to close the gap between parties’ pledges and what science re-
quires” (ENB, 2009a: 4).  
At the same time developed countries including the EU promote their “experi-
ence with a top-down approach, which looks at science for defining the scale of neces-
sary emission reductions, and then works bottom up to identify how emissions could 
be reduced and under which sectors” (ENB 2009a: 5). Developed countries use scien-
tific evidence based on the IPCC to argue for a comprehensive climate treaty that in-
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cludes the developing countries. Science itself is less used as ‘weapon’ in a politicised 
context but rather as argumentative and interpretative tool to underpin the gov-
ernments’ or negotiation bloc’s positions: 
 
The work of experts and the IPCC as the intergovernmental agency providing the 
IPCC reports had a very large influence on the countries positions, certainly on the 
[country] and the EU position. After all, this is the reason we are here and negotiat-
ing – to do something about climate change. And to do so, we need scientific tar-
gets and input. 
(EU 1 4/2010) 
 
The IPCC’s ability to play this reconciling role is to a certain extent based on its 
institutional set-up requiring consensus by both the scientific community based on an 
extensive and open peer-review process and by governments for information to be in-
cluded in the major assessment reports (Skodvin 2000).  
Finally, experts have a certain control about the way their input is used by gov-
ernments depending on how they participate in the negotiations. They cross a thres-
hold towards a more political use of their input when joining government delegations, 
which may require them to provide the ‘right’ science is in line with government ob-
jectives: 
 
[The government representatives] expect us to represent the [national] position, once it 
has been decided upon. Sometimes it is not always possible to take on the position necessary 
to address climate change issues appropriately, and then we have to advocate the compromise 
position of the government. 
(Expert who joined a G-8 government delegation; Umbrella Group 2 12/2009) 
 
 
It can be argued however that experts would choose not to join government 
delegations without sharing their policy and secondary beliefs, i.e. if their research 
findings and personal convictions do not widely match the government’s negotiation 
position. In this case, the political and instrumental use of expert-based knowledge 
(Weible 2008; Weible et al. 2012) would not remain distinct, but converges. If experts 
would not want their input to be ‘misused’ for political ammunition, they would in 
their own interest opt to remain a representative of a research and independent NGO 
and not join a government delegation. 
A second explanation for the limited tension between instrumental and political 
use in this case study on the international level is the aspect of timing. Instrumental 
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use can turn into political use as the negotiations progress. The same scientific advice 
from the same expert can initially be used instrumentally by civil servants to propose a 
negotiation position for their country at the beginning of a negotiation cycle. As politi-
cians get involved to decide on the negotiation position and as the negotiations within 
the UNFCCC progress, the instrumental use shifts towards a political use to also justi-
fy (ideally coinciding) political objectives.  
 
 
Conclusion 
The objective of this article was to examine empirically the conditions under 
which expert input has the highest chances of influencing policy-making on the inter-
national level and how government representatives use the input provided by experts. 
It thus widened the analytical lens of the literature on expert influence in policy mak-
ing focused on the national level (Montpetit 2011; Weible 2008; Weible et al. 2012; 
Weiss 1977) to also include the international aspect of multilateral negotiations. It 
confirms the importance of deep knowledge, long-term involvement in the policy 
subsystem and networks as key factors for experts to successfully provide input 
(Weible et al. 2012). A key finding is the importance of policy-entrepreneurial strat-
egies such as pro-actively approaching government representatives and the potentially 
high influence when experts join government delegations as this may grant them ac-
cess to the negotiation text.  
The use of scientific evidence by policy makers depends on whether the nego-
tiations are conducted on the technocratic level by civil servants or on the political 
level by politicians. The case study on the international climate change negotiations 
between 2009 and 2011 uncovered that civil servants predominantly use the scientific 
input instrumentally, i.e. as ‘neutral’ input from a positivist perspective to gain a bet-
ter understanding of technical issues as opposed to the input by interest groups. Politi-
cians tend to engage in political use of the expert input to underpin their political ob-
jectives on the political level. Although the UNFCCC can be classified as an adver-
sarial policy subsystem (Weible 2008), the scientific consensus on climate change fa-
cilitated by the IPCC resulted in a convergence of policy beliefs that action to miti-
gate climate change and to adapt to its consequences is a normative imperative. How-
ever, the secondary beliefs on how exactly this should be achieved are highly contro-
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versial. This constellation results in a convergence of instrumental and political use of 
expert input by all advocacy coalitions as these interpret similar expert input based on 
the consensual IPCC findings depending on their political, i.e. secondary belief-based 
normative objectives. Generalisations of qualitative findings based on a single case 
study are difficult and limited (King et al. 1994), however the findings’ applicability 
could be further tested in other policy fields on the international level. Especially 
since climate change is a particularly ‘malign’ (Miles et al 2002) and ‘super-wicked’ 
(Levin et al. 2012) area and thus least likely for expert influence to occur, we would 
expect to find better conditions in other policy fields more receptive to scientific input 
such as the ozone regime.  
Three points for further discussion emerge from the research. First of all, how 
can the accountability and legitimacy of experts be improved (Gulbrandsen 2011) 
given the tendency of government representatives to engage in boundary work and 
use scientific information to bypass deliberative processes and underpin their position 
as ‘what science demands’ (Jasanoff 2012)? Secondly, experts need to find a balance 
between their understanding as actors with specific deep core, policy and secondary 
beliefs (Weible et al. 2009) that channel into interests from a constructivist point of 
view (Jasanoff 1990) and government’s tendency to boundary work and utilize their 
research for political reasons. The peer-review process (Jasanoff 2012), openness re-
garding diverging research findings and underlying assumptions certainly play a role 
in this debate. Finally, this research illustrated that experts play a key role not only in 
creating and disseminating scientific knowledge, but also in increasing the impact of 
their knowledge by actively seeking out government representatives and presenting 
their findings while maintaining their academic ‘neutrality’ as a first step towards in-
fluencing policy making. Policy implications of these findings are strategies how ex-
perts can proactively support policy measures to address climate change. Given that 
climate change is a particularly difficult issue area, a promising way forward for do-
mestic and international climate legislation is to create path-dependencies, increase 
support of key actors over time and expand the population supportive of the proposed 
hardly to reverse policy as proposed by Levin, Cashore, Bernstein and Auld (2012). 
Experts can play a key role in facilitating the transfer of policies across horizontal and 
vertical levels of governance. They can furthermore make use of their credibility and 
reputation to propose policies with co-benefits for economic development and climate 
mitigation that are difficult to reverse via in-built sustainable path dependencies that 
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also facilitate investment decisions in clean technologies for private actors. Experts 
can also be supportive in devising strategies for ‘snowballing’ these policies to other 
countries using international negotiation forums such as the UNFCCC. 
 
 
 
Bibliography	  
 
Adams, D. (2004). Usable Knowledge in Public Policy. Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 63(1), 29-42. 
 
Andresen, S. (2013). International Regime Effectiveness. In Falkner, R. (Ed). The 
Handbook of Global Climate and Environment Policy, Chapter 18. Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 304-320.  
Auer, M. (1998). Colleagues or Combatants? Experts as Environmental Diplomats. 
International Negotiation 3(2), 267-287. 
 
Betsill, M., & Corell, E. (2008). NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental 
Organizations in International Environment Negotiations. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Bernstein, S., & Cashore, B. (2012). Complex global governance and domestic poli-
cies: four pathways of influence. International Affairs, 88(3), 585-604. 
 
Beveridge, R. (2012). Consultants, depoliticization and area-shifting in the policy-
process: privatizing water in Berlin. Policy Sciences, 45(1), 47-68. 
 
Biermann, F. (2001). Big science, small impacts - in the South? The influence of glo-
bal environmental assessments on expert communities in India. Global Environmental 
Change, 11, 297-309. 
 
Biermann, F. (2002). Institutions for Scientific Advice: Global Environmental As-
sessments and Their Influence in Developing Countries. Global Governance, 8, 195-
219. 
 
Biermann, F., Pattberg, P. & Zelli, F. (2010). Global Climate Governance Beyond 
2012: Architecture, Agency and Adaptation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Biermann, F. (2012). Curtain down and nothing settled. Earth System Governance 
Working Paper, 26, 1-24. 
 
Boehmer-Christiansen, S. (1994a). Global climate protection policy - the limits of 
scientific advice: part 1. Global Environmental Change, 4(2), 140-159. 
 
Boehmer-Christiansen, S. (1994b). Global climate protection policy - the limits of 
scientific advice: part 2. Global Environmental Change, 4(3), 185-200. 
	   27	  
 
Bomberg, E. (2007). Policy learning in an enlarged European Union: environmental 
NGOs and new policy instruments. Journal of European Public Policy, 14(2), 248-
268. 
 
Cohen, S. (2006). Understanding environmental policy. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press. 
 
Creswell, J. (2009). Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches. Los Angeles: Sage Publications. 
 
Depledge, J. (2005). The Organization of Global Negotiations. Constructing the Cli-
mate Change Regime. London: Earthscan. 
 
ENB. (2009a). Summary of the Barcelona Climate Change Talks: 2-9 November 
2011. Earth Negotiations Bulletin, IISD Reporting Services, 12(447).  
 
ENB. (2009b). Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: 7-19 
December 2011. Earth Negotiations Bulletin, IISD Reporting Services, 12(459). 
Available from http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop15/. 
 
ENB. (2010). Summary of the Cancun Climate Change Conference: 29 November - 
11 December 2011. Earth Negotiations Bulletin, IISD Reporting Services, 12(498). 
[cited July 2012]. Available from http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop16/. 
 
ENB (2011) Summary of the Durban Climate Change Conference: 28 November - 11 
December 2011. Earth Negotiations Bulletin, IISD Reporting Services, 12(534). [cited 
July 2012]. Available from http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop17/. 
 
Everett, S. (2003). The Policy Cycle: Democratic Process or Rational Paradigm Re-
visited? Australian Journal of Public Administration, 62(2), 65-70. 
 
GCS. 2013. Global Climate Scam. [cited July 2013]. Available from 
http://www.globalclimatescam.com/. 
 
Granovetter, M.S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 
78(6), 1360–1380. 
 
Gulbrandsen, L. (2008). The Role of Science in Environmental Governance: Compet-
ing Knowledge Producers in Swedish and Norwegian Forestry. Global Environmental 
Politics, 8(2), 99-122. 
 
Gulbrandsen, L., & Andresen, S. (2004). NGO influence in the implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol: compliance, flexibility mechanisms, and sinks. Global Envi-
ronmental Politics, 4(4), 54-75. 
 
Gulbrandsen, M. (2011). Research institutes as hybrid organizations: central challen-
ges to their legitimacy. Policy Sciences, 44(3), 215-230. 
 
	   28	  
Haas, P.M. (1990) Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Envi-
ronmental Protection. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Haas, P.M. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination. International Organization, 46(1), 1-35. 
 
Haas, P.M. (2004). When does power listen to truth? A constructivist approach to the 
policy process. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(4), 569-592. 
 
IPCC. (2007). Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Valencia: Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change. 
 
Jasanoff, S. (1990). The Fifth Branch. Science Advisers as Policymakers. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Jasanoff, S. (2012). Testing Time for Climate Science. Science, 328, 695-696. 
 
King, G., Keohane, R.O., Verba, S. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Infer-
ence in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Kingdon, J. (1984). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. (2nd ed.). New York: 
Harper Collins. 
 
Kjellen, B. (2007). A New Diplomacy for Sustainable Development: The Challenge of 
Global Change. London: Routledge. 
 
Lahat, L. (2011). How can leaders' perceptions guide policy analysis in an era of gov-
ernance? Policy Sciences, 44, 135-155. 
 
Lawhon, M. (2012). Contesting power, trust and legitimacy in the South African e-
waste transition. Policy Sciences, 45(1), 69-86. 
 
Levin, K., Cashore, B., Bernstein, S., & Auld, G. (2012). Overcoming the tragedy of 
super wicked problems: constraining our future selves to ameliorate global climate 
change. Policy Sciences, 45, 123-152. 
 
Mason, M. (2005). The New Accountability: Environmental Responsibility Across 
Borders. London: Earthscan. 
 
Miles, E., Underdal, A., & Andresen, S. (2002). International Regime Effectiveness: 
Confronting Theory with Evidence. Cambridge, MIT Press. 
 
Mitchell, R., Clark, W.C., & Cash, W. (2006). Information and Influence. In Mitchell, 
R., Clark, W.C., Cash, W., & Dickinson, N. (eds). Global Environmental Assess-
ments: Information and Influence. Cambridge: MIT Press, 307-338. 
 
Montpetit, E. (2011). Scientific Credibility, Disagreement, and Error Costs in 17 Bio-
technology Policy Subsystems. Policy Studies Journal, 39(3), 513-533. 
 
	   29	  
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collec-
tive Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Owens, S. (2010). Learning across levels of governance: expert advice and the adop-
tion of carbon dioxide emission reduction targets in the UK. Global Environmental 
Change, 20, 394-401. 
 
Ozawa, C.P. (1991). Recasting Science: Consensual Procedures in Public Policy 
Making. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
Roberts, N., King, P. (1991). Policy Entrepreneurs: Their Activity Structure and 
Function in the Policy Process. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theo-
ry, 1(2), 147-175. 
 
Skodvin, T. (2000). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. In: Andresen, 
S., Skodvin, T., Underdal, A., & Wettestad, J. (eds). Science and politics in interna-
tional environmental regimes. Between integrity and involvement. Manchester: Man-
chester University Press. 
 
Sharman, A., Holmes, J. (2010). Evidence-Based Policy or Policy-Based Evidence 
Gathering? Biofuels, the EU and the 10% Target. Environmental Policy and Govern-
ance, 20, 309-321. 
 
Stern, N. (2006). Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Stone, D. (2000). Non-governmental policy transfer: the strategies of independent 
policy institutes. Governance, 13(1), 45-62. 
 
Thompson, A. (2010). Rational design in motion: uncertainty and flexibility in the 
global climate regime. European Journal of International Relations, 16(2), 269-296. 
 
Underdal, A. (2000). Science and Politics: the anatomy of an uneasy partnership. In 
(eds) Andresen, S., Skodvin, T., Underdal, A., & Wettestad, J. Science and politics in 
international environmental regimes. Between integrity and involvement. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
 
UNFCCC. (2010a). Conference of the Parties-15. List of Participants. Part 1. [cited 
October 2012]. Available from 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/misc01p01.pdf. 
 
UNFCCC. (2010b). Conference of the Parties-15. List of Participants. Part 2. [cited 
October 2012]. Available from 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/misc01p02.pdf. 
 
UNFCCC. (2010c). Cancun Agreements. Decision FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1. New 
York: United Nations.  
 
UNFCCC. (2011a). Report of COP-17. Proceedings. Decision 
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 New York: United Nations.  
	   30	  
 
UNFCCC. (2011b). Report of COP-17. Action taken by COP-17. Decision 
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 New York: United Nations.  
 
UNFCCC. (2011c). COP-17 Side Events and Exhibits. [cited October 2012]. Avail-
able from 
http://regserver.unfccc.int/seors/reports/archive.html?session_id=COP17/CMP7 
 
Van Kerkhoof, L., & Lebel, L. (2006). Linking Knowledge and Action for Sustain-
able Development. Annual Review of Environmental Resources, 31, 445-477. 
 
Weible, C.M. (2008). Expert-Based Information and Policy Subsystems: A Review 
and Synthesis. Policy Studies Journal, 36(4), 615-635. 
 
Weible, C., & Sabatier, P.A. (2005). Comparing Policy Networks: Marine Protected 
Areas in California. Policy Studies Journal, 2, 181-204. 
 
Weible, C.M., Sabatier, P., McQueen, K. (2009). Themes and Variations: Taking 
Stock of the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Policy Studies Journal, 37(1), 121-140. 
 
Weible, C.M., Heikkila, T., deLeon, P., & Sabatier, P.A. (2012). Understanding the 
policy process. Policy Sciences, 45(1), 1-21. 
 
Weiss, C. (1977). Research for policy's sake: the enlightenment function of social re-
search. Policy Analysis, 3, 531-545. 
 
Weiss, C. (1979). The many meanings of research utilization. Public Administration 
Review, 39(5), 426-431. 
 
Yamin, F., Rambharos, M. (2011). The Cancun Agreements and the Way Forward. 
Stakeholders Dialogue and Conclusion. International Dialogue on Mitigation. 
11/6/2011. Bonn: UNFCCC.  
 
Young, J., Mendizabal, E. (2009). Helping researchers become policy entrepreneurs. 
How to develop engagement strategies for evidence-based policy-making. ODI Brief-
ing Paper 53. London: Overseas Development Institute. 
 
 
 
